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Abstract
The ABL rule is derived as a tool of standard quantum mechanics. The
ontological significance of the existence of objective probabilities is dis-
cussed. Objections by Kastner [preceding article] and others to coun-
terfactual uses of the ABL rule are refuted. Metaphysical presumptions
leading to such views as Kastner is defending in her Comment are exam-
ined and shown to be unwarranted.
1 INTRODUCTION
Following Mermin [1], I have characterized some of the probabilities that quantum
mechanics allows us to calculate as being objective in the sense that they have noth-
ing to do with ignorance—there is nothing for us to be ignorant of [2]. I have ar-
gued that the objective probabilities associated with attributions of results to unper-
formed measurements should be calculated according to the ABL rule, first derived
by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz [3]. Ruth Kastner [4, 5, 6] and others [7, 8, 9]
have raised objections concerning the appropriateness of probability assignments to
counterfactuals based on the ABL rule. In the present article I re-derive the ABL
rule, clarify the meaning of objective probabilities and the significance of their exis-
tence, and respond to these objections.
In Sec. 2 both the Born rule and the ABL rule are derived from the standard,
quantum-mechanical representation of contingent properties [10] as projection oper-
ators on a Hilbert space. Section 3 refutes the objections by Kastner and the other
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authors to counterfactual uses of the ABL rule. Section 4 elucidates the significance
of the existence of objective probabilities, and Section 5 is devoted to unearthing un-
warranted metaphysical presumptions leading to such views as Kastner is defending
in her Comment [4].
2 OBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES AND THE ABL RULE
Quantum mechanics is unequivocal about the probabilities it assigns to the possible
results of possible measurements. If we represent the potentially attributable [11]
properties of a system as projection operators on a Hilbert space H, there is no
ambiguity as to the form of the prior probability measure p (qi, t), which is based
solely on properties possessed by the system before the time t [12, 13, 14]:
p (qi, t) = Tr[W(t)Pqi]. (1)
As is well known, W is a unique density operator [that is, a unique self-adjoint,
positive operator satisfying Tr(W) = 1 and W2 ≤W]. Tr signifies the trace defined
by the formula Tr(X) :=
∑
i〈i|X|i〉 for any orthonormal basis {|i〉} inH. IfW2 = W,
W(t) projects on a one-dimensional subspace ofH and thus is equivalent—apart from
an irrelevant phase factor—to a “state” vector |ψ(t)〉. Such a “state” is said to be
“pure,” and the system is said to be “prepared” in it. With W(t) = |ψ(t)〉〈ψ(t)| and
Pqi = |qi〉〈qi|, we obtain the familiar Born rule:
p (qi, t) = Tr[|ψ(t)〉〈ψ(t)|Pqi] = 〈ψ(t)|Pqi|ψ(t)〉 = |〈ψ(t)|qi〉|2. (2)
Applying the Born rule twice, we obtain the prior probability that a system with a
prior probability measure |a〉〈a| will first be observed to have the property |qi〉〈qi|
and then be found in possession of the property |b〉〈b|:
p (qi, b|a) = |〈a|qi〉〈qi|b〉|2. (3)
(For simplicity’s sake we will assume that the Hamiltonian is zero between mea-
surements.) Although readers familiar with the mathematical formalism of quantum
mechanics are not likely to stumble over this expression, it involves a conceptual
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transition that needs to be justified. When we ask for the probability that qi, given
a, the projection operator |qi〉〈qi| represents a potentially attributable property of
the system. When we ask for the probability that b, given qi, the same operator
represents a probability measure. How do we get from a property to a probability
measure?
If we start out with a probability measure W1 = |a〉〈a| and then find that the
system has the property P, we must update our probability measure accordingly.
If the measurement that yields the property P is ideal—as is generally assumed
when discussing interpretational issues,—the updated probability measure assigns
probability zero to any property P′ for which PP′ = 0. Hence the “state” of the
system “collapses”—not mysteriously but self-evidently—to the “state”
W2 =
P|a〉〈a|P
〈a|P|a〉 . (4)
The denominator ensures that the probability of the trivial property, represented by
the identity operator 1, remains 1. If we put |qi〉〈qi| in place of P, this reduces to
W2 = |qi〉〈qi|. Thus the updated probability measure is represented by the same
operator as the property observed [15].
Next, we consider the probability that a system with a prior probability measure
|a〉〈a| will be found in possession of property |b〉〈b| given that in the meantime Q
is measured but regardless of the result of this measurement. This is obviously the
sum of probabilities
p (b|a,Q) =∑
j
|〈a|qj〉〈qj|b〉|2. (5)
According to Bayes’ theorem, the probability that the intervening measurement
yields qi given that the prior probability measure is |a〉〈a| and given that the fi-
nal measurement yields b, then is
p (qi|a, b) = p (qi, b|a)
p (b|a,Q) =
|〈a|qi〉〈qi|b〉|2∑
j |〈a|qj〉〈qj|b〉|2
. (6)
This is (one of the possible forms of) the ABL rule. Like the Born rule, it follows
straight from the quantum-mechanical representation of contingent properties as
projection operators on a Hilbert space.
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In principle, both rules have an objective as well as a subjective application. If
Q is actually measured, both rules assign probabilities that are subjective inasmuch
as they are based on probability measures that fail to take account of at least one
relevant fact—the result of the measurement of Q. In order to be considered objec-
tive, a quantum-mechanical probability must be assigned on the basis of all relevant
facts. If the Q measurement is actually made, the objective probabilities associated
with its possible outcomes are trivially either zero or one. Thus both rules can assign
nontrivial objective probabilities only if the Q measurement is not made. But this
is not sufficient. Since Born probabilities take no account of (future) facts about
the system’s future properties, they can be considered objective only if there are
no relevant such facts. This is hardly ever the case. Hence, in general, objective
probabilities are calculated according to the ABL rule. We can drop the qualifying
“in general” if we use the trivial property in place of |b〉〈b| if there never will be any
facts about the system’s future properties. In this case the ABL rule reduces to the
Born rule:
|〈a|qi〉|2〈qi|1|qi〉∑
j〈a|qj〉〈qj|a〉〈qj|1|qj〉
=
|〈a|qi〉|2
〈a|
(∑
j |qj〉〈qj|
)
|a〉
= |〈a|qi〉|2. (7)
Thus objective probabilities are calculated according to the ABL rule, and they are
assigned to contrary-to-fact conditionals, or counterfactuals, of the following general
form:
(A) If a measurement of observable Q were performed on system S between an
actual measurement yielding the result |a〉〈a| at time ta and an actual mea-
surement yielding the result |b〉〈b| at time tb, but no measurement is actually
performed between ta and tb, then the measurement of Q would yield qi with
probability p (qi|a, b).
For p (qi|a, b) to be objective, it is not enough that Q is not actually measured; it is
necessary that no measurement is performed between ta and tb. If any other mea-
surement M is performed during this time span, p (qi|a, b) is based on an incomplete
set of facts—it does not take account of the result ofM—and is therefore subjective.
Note that the antecedent clause states not only that the Q measurement is made
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(counterfactually or in a possible world) but also that at the times ta and tb the
respective results |a〉〈a| and |b〉〈b| are obtained (that is, they are as in the actual
world). The observation that the result obtained at tb might have been different had
the Q measurement been actually made, is irrelevant to the truth of (A) inasmuch
as it is based on an incomplete set of facts—it does not take into account the result
obtained at tb—while statement (A) is based on a complete set of facts, as it must be
in order to assign objective probabilities. Probabilities are objective only if they are
assigned to unperformed measurements, and only if the assignment is based on all
relevant facts. The second “if” translates into the strong ceteris paribus clause that
all measurement results obtained in the actual world are also obtained in the possible
worlds considered by (A). These possible worlds differ from the actual world only in
that they contain one extra measurement that is not made in the actual world.
3 REPLY TO KASTNER
Ruth Kastner [4, 5, 6] and others [7, 8, 9] have raised objections concerning the
appropriateness of probability assignments to counterfactuals based on the ABL
rule. The first objection I will address is this [6]: Since the Q measurement is not
actually made, the following rule should be used instead of the ABL rule (6):
pK(qi|a, b) = p (qi, b|a)
p (b|a) =
|〈a|qi〉〈qi|b〉|2
|〈a|b〉|2 =
|〈a|qi〉〈qi|b〉|2
|∑j〈a|qj〉〈qj|b〉|2
. (8)
This rule combines, according to Bayes’ theorem, the probability p (qi, b|a) that a sys-
tem with a prior probability measure |a〉〈a| will first be observed to have property
|qi〉〈qi| and then be found in possession of property |b〉〈b|, with the probability p (b|a)
that an equally “prepared” [16] system will be observed to have property |b〉〈b| given
that in the meantime no measurement is made. In the numerator Kastner assumes
that Q is measured, and in the denominator she assumes that between ta and tb no
measurement takes place. Whereas in the denominator of the ABL rule (6) proba-
bilities are added—the Q measurement is assumed to be made,—in the denominator
of Kastner’s rule (8) amplitudes are added, which entails that the Q measurement
is not made. The ABL rule thus is consistent—it assumes throughout that the Q
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measurement is made,— while the same cannot be said of Kastner’s rule.
A similar inconsistency mars arguments by Sharp and Shanks [7], Cohen [8],
Miller [9], and Kastner [5, 6] purporting to prove the general invalidity of counter-
factual uses of the ABL rule. These arguments have been refuted—cogently, in my
opinion—by Vaidman [17], though Kastner [18], predictably, takes a different view.
What these “proofs” purport to show is that the counterfactual use of the ABL rule
yields results that are inconsistent with standard quantum mechanics. Specifically,
it is claimed that this use entails the following equation:
p (qj|a) = p (qj|a, b1) p (b1|a) + p (qj |a, b2) p (b2|a)
=
p (qj, b1|a)
p (b1|a,Q) p (b1|a) +
p (qj , b2|a)
p (b2|a,Q) p (b2|a). (9)
Since the final measurement of the observable B, assumed to have two eigenvalues
b1 and b2, is actually made, the Born probability p (qj|a) of the outcome qj of an
intermediate measurement of Q is uncontroversially the sum of the probabilities
p (qj, b1|a) and p (qj, b2|a). According to eq. (9) this is not always the case. It is the
case if
p (bi|a,Q) =
∑
j
|〈a|qj〉〈qj |bi〉|2
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j
〈a|qj〉〈qj |bi〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
= p (bi|a). (10)
This holds if Q = A (the observable measured at time ta) or Q = B, or if for j 6= k,
ℜ (〈qk|a〉〈a|qj〉〈qj |bi〉〈bi|qk〉) = 0. (11)
Kastner states these conditions in Refs. [5] and [6]. It is then argued that since
the counterfactual use of the ABL rule in eq. (9) generally leads to inconsistencies
with standard quantum mechanics, this use is illegitimate unless one of those condi-
tions is satisfied. However, what is illegitimate is not the counterfactual use of the
ABL rule but the equation on which this conclusion is based. Like Kastner’s rule
(8), eq. (9) combines expressions that imply that the intervening measurement is
made—namely, p (qj|a, b1) and p (qj|a, b2)—with expressions that imply the contrary,
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namely, p (b1|a) and p (b2|a). Note that it would not improve matters if instead of
the ABL probabilities p (qj |a, bi) the probabilities pK(qj |a, bi) were used in eq. (9)
[which would ensure that p (qj|a) = p (qj , b1|a) + p (qj, b2|a)] since the probabilities
pK(qj |a, bi) involve the same inconsistency. In order to be consistent we must assume
throughout that the intervening measurement is made. This entails that instead of
the probabilities p (bi|a) the probabilities p (bi|a,Q) must be used in eq. (9), which
likewise ensures that p (qj|a) = p (qj, b1|a) + p (qj, b2|a).
One might perceive a contradiction between the counterfactual (A) and my in-
sistence on the necessity of assuming consistently that the intervening measurement
is made. But this apparent “contradiction” is the very nature of a counterfactual.
Counterfactuals are statements about conceivable worlds that are different from the
actual world in certain specified respects and like the actual world in all other rele-
vant respects. The worlds considered by (A) are different from the actual world in
that between ta and tb a measurement is made that is not made in the actual world;
in all other respects they are like the actual world. In particular, the measurements
at ta and tb have the specified outcomes. Since (A) is a statement about conceiv-
able worlds in which the Q measurement is made, the probabilities it assigns to the
possible outcomes of this measurement must have the same values as the probabili-
ties that we would assign, on the same basis, to the possible outcomes of the same
measurement, if this were actually made.
Kastner denies the validity of the counterfactual (A) also on the ground that
it allegedly violates the requirement of cotenability. A counterfactual C refers to
conceivable worlds that must satisfy two conditions: They must be different from
the actual world in certain specified respects, and they must be like the actual world
in all other relevant respects. If it turned out that there are no conceivable worlds
that satisfy both conditions, C would fail to satisfy this crucial requirement.
Consider a conceivable world Wi in which the Q measurement yields an outcome
qi to which (A) assigns probability zero. (To each possible outcome qk there corre-
sponds a conceivable worldWk.) Wi fails to satisfy the second condition inasmuch as
it is unlike the actual world in another relevant respect: It does not obey the actual
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physical laws. But this is something that we learn from (A) rather than something
that invalidates (A). Statement (A) itself tells us that the conceivable world Wi
is not a nomologically possible world inasmuch as under the specified conditions a
measurement of Q would never yield the result qi.
What Kastner has in mind is something more serious. According to the met-
alinguistic account of counterfactuals [19], invoked by Kastner [5], a counterfactual
is true if its antecedent conjoined with laws of nature and statements of background
conditions logically entails its consequent. The background conditions must be stable
(that is, they must hold independently of the truth value of the antecedent). Kast-
ner claims that (A) violates either the requirement of cotenability—the background
conditions depend on the truth value of the antecedent—or the laws of nature.
Before addressing Kastner’s argument I will show that both the stability of the
background conditions and the laws of nature are in fact respected by (A). The
antecedent is the statement that a measurement of observable Q is performed on
system S between ta and tb. The background conditions consist in the observation
(or the factually warranted possession) of the properties |a〉〈a| and |b〉〈b| at the
respective times ta and tb, as well as in the absence of any measurement between
ta and tb other than that specified in the antecedent. The relevant laws of nature
are the principles of quantum mechanics. Being statistical laws, they enable us
to assign probabilities to the possible results of measurements, and being universal
laws that have never been found to conflict with experimental data, they allow us
to apply them counterfactually—to assign probabilities to the possible results of
unperformed measurements. These assignments can be made on the basis of all
relevant facts about either the past or the future properties of S using the Born
rule, or on the basis of all relevant facts about the past and future properties of S
using the ABL rule. Since both rules are part of standard quantum mechanics, none
of these assignments can conflict with standard quantum mechanics. Nor can they
conflict with the required stability of background conditions. If obtaining |a〉〈a| at ta
and |b〉〈b| at tb is nomologically possible without interposition of any measurement,
the same is nomologically possible whenever a measurement is interposed [20]. The
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reason this is so is that the interposition of a measurement never decreases the
probability of obtaining |b〉〈b| at tb given |a〉〈a| at ta:
p (b|a) = |〈a|b〉|2 = |∑
k
〈a|qk〉〈qk|b〉|2 ≤
∑
k
|〈a|qk〉〈qk|b〉|2 = p (b|a,Q). (12)
Thus the background conditions are consistent with both the truth and the falsity of
the antecedent. And given the necessity of assuming consistently that the intervening
measurement is made, the antecedent, conjoined with the relevant laws of nature
and the background condition statement, logically entails that the probability of
obtaining the value qi is as given by the ABL rule [21].
If Kastner reaches a different conclusion, it is because her understanding of the
background conditions and/or of the relevant laws of nature is different from mine.
That she thinks differently about the background conditions is obvious from her
discussion [5] of the experiment considered by Sharp and Shanks [7]. In this exper-
iment spin-1
2
particles are prepared at time t1 with probability measure |a+〉 and
subjected at time t2 to a measurement of their spin component along the b axis. We
are accustomed to read |a+〉 as “spin up along direction a”, but what |a+〉 really
signifies depends on the time to which it refers. While at t1 the system possesses
the property represented by |a+〉〈a+|, for t > t1 the ket |a+〉 or the density operator
W = |a+〉〈a+| represents a probability measure that says nothing about properties
possessed at t; it only tells us that the prior probability of obtaining the result “spin
up along direction c” at the time t is 〈c+|W|c+〉. By the same token, if the final
measurement indicates that the property represented by the operator |b+〉〈b+| is pos-
sessed at t2, then this operator also represents the “time-reversed” density operator
W′ that yields the posterior probability [22] 〈c+|W′|c+〉 of obtaining the result “spin
up along direction c” at the time t < t2.
Kastner, following Sharp and Shanks, states that the measurement at t2 yields
a mixture M consisting of two subensembles. Thus she considers an ensemble of
measurements, performed on an ensemble of systems, rather than an individual
measurement, for an individual measurement does not yield a mixture consisting
of subensembles; it yields a result, in this case either the property represented by
|b+〉〈b+| or the property represented by |b−〉〈b−|. Thereafter Kastner states what she
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takes to be “the basic conceptual problem”: “in considering a counterfactual mea-
surement of the spin along c (observable σc) [at an intermediate time t] we must take
into account all the effects of that measurement on the system. The measurement of
the observable σc results in a change in the mixture M of post-selected ensembles”
into a different mixture M ′. Kastner goes on to say that “the mixture, M or M ′,
obtaining at time t2 . . .must enter into the counterfactual calculation,” and that
“the characterization of the mixture obtaining at t2 must be included in the back-
ground condition statement . . . ” Since this mixture depends on whether or not the
σc measurement is performed at the time t, Kastner concludes that the statement
of background conditions holding when the antecedent is false (no intervening mea-
surement) becomes false when the antecedent holds, and is therefore not cotenable
with the antecedent.
Kastner is led to this fallacious conclusion by conflating statements about ensem-
bles with statements about individual systems. It is true that if we start with an
ensemble of systems possessing property |a+〉〈a+| at time t1, the result or effect of
an ensemble of σb measurements performed at t2 is a mixture M consisting of two
subensembles, one containing systems possessing the property |b+〉〈b+|, and another
containing systems possessing the property |b−〉〈b−|, while the result or effect of two
ensembles of measurements, one of σc performed at time t and one of σb performed
at time t2, is a mixture M
′ consisting of four subensembles corresponding to that
many combinations of possible measurement outcomes. But all this is irrelevant to
the truth of (A) or the cotenability of its antecedent with its background conditions,
for (A) is a statement about an individual system, not a statement about an ensem-
ble. The only effect of the intervening measurement on an individual system, under
the specified background conditions, is that at the time t it has either the property
|c+〉〈c+| or the property |c−〉〈c−|, neither of which it has if the intervening measure-
ment is not made. The relevant question is not: Might the final measurement have a
different outcome from the one it actually has if the σc measurement were performed?
The relevant question is: Are the background conditions—|a+〉〈a+| possessed at t1
and |b+〉〈b+| possessed at t2—consistent with both the truth and the falsity of the
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antecedent? The answer is affirmative, and this is sufficient for cotenability and
hence for the legitimacy of (A).
In her Comment [4], Kastner introduces one Dr. X who asks himself the irrelevant
question: “How might the data of my experiment have changed if I had made a
measurement at time t that I did not, in fact, make?” Obviously, Dr. X might not
have obtained the result |b〉〈b| at the time tb. The counterfactual (A) addresses a
different question in that it rules out this possibility. While Dr. X’s question assumes
the possession of property |a〉〈a| at time ta, (A) in addition assumes the possession
of property |b〉〈b| at time tb. According to Kastner, one gets from the question
asked by Dr. X to the question addressed by (A) by requiring the following: “If a
measurement of observable Q had been performed, system S would (with certainty)
have been pre- and post-selected with outcomes a and b as in the actual world.” This
requirement, so Kastner claims, correctly expresses the cotenability that is necessary
for the consistency and the truth of (A). And since this requirement is obviously “not
guaranteed to hold,” she concludes that the counterfactual statement (A) fails [23].
By requiring that system S would with certainty have the properties a and b at
the respective time ta and tb, Kastner introduces an element of nomological necessity
that makes nonsense of (A). What she thereby refutes is not (A) but the following
counterfactual (A′), which requires no refutation because it is patently false:
(A′) If a measurement of observable Q were performed on an ensemble of systems
between an actually performed measurement of observable A at time ta and an
actually performed measurement of observable B at time tb, but no measure-
ment is actually made between ta and tb, then the measurement of Q would
yield qi with probability p (qi|a, b), and the measurements of A and B would
(with certainty) yield the respective outcomes a and b.”
The counterfactual (A) attributes a probability to a possible result of a possible
measurement hypothetically performed at time t on an individual system S which
(in the actual world) happens to possess the properties a and b at the respective
times ta and tb. As has been explained at length in Ref. [2], nothing ever causes
(i) a measurement, qua attempt to determine the value of some observable, to yield
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a result or (ii) a measurement, qua successful determination of the value of some
observable, to take place. In other words, the actual events or states of affairs that
indicate the possession of a contingent property (by a system) or of a value (by an
observable) are causal primaries, and this not in the sense that nothing ever causes
a measurement to yield this particular value rather than that, but in the sense that
nothing ever causes a measurement to be successful or to take place. (A causal
primary is an event or state of affairs the occurrence or existence of which is not
necessitated by any cause, antecedent or otherwise.) What the laws of quantum
mechanics encapsulate is statistical correlations between causal primaries. If we take
certain measurement results as given, we can use those laws to assign probabilities
to the possible results of other measurements, which may or may not be performed.
In particular, we can consider the possession of a (at time ta) and of b (at time tb) as
given, and use the laws of quantum mechanics to assign probabilities to the possible
results of a not actually performed intervening measurement. In so doing we do not
assume that the occurrences of the measurements at ta and tb are necessitated by
anything, let alone that the respective outcomes a and b are.
The only way to test probability assignments is to determine relative frequencies
with the help of appropriately selected ensembles. In the case of (A), the appro-
priate ensemble is an ensemble of possible worlds in which system S is identically
“prepared” or “pre-selected” as well as identically “retropared” or “post-selected,”
and in which the Q measurement is made. Although Kastner introduces one Dr. X†
who is “associated with” all of those possible worlds, it is obvious that this ensemble
is not empirically accessible. It is possible, however, to reproduce this ensemble in
the actual world, by turning it into an ensemble of identically “prepared” and “retro-
pared” copies of S. In order to render testable the probabilities that (A) assigns, we
have no choice but to use an ensemble of pre- and post-selected systems. Yet the
probabilities that (A) assigns are single-case probabilities; they are assigned to the
possible outcomes of a single measurement on a single system that happens to possess
property a at time ta and property b at time tb. The selection does not reflect any
nomological constraint but merely serves to make those probabilities measurable.
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Kastner is committed to denying that counterfactual probability assignments can
be tested inasmuch as she considers the probabilities that can be measured (using
pre- and post-selected ensembles) to differ quantitatively from the corresponding
counterfactual probabilities. Accordingly, she considers statement (A) to be distinct
from the following statement:
(B) In a possible world in which observable Q is measured at time t and system S
yields outcomes |a〉〈a| and |b〉〈b| at times ta and tb, respectively, the probability
of obtaining result qi is given by p (qi|a, b).
To claim a quantitative difference between counterfactual and non-counterfactual
assignments of quantum-mechanical probabilities or a significant difference between
statements (A) and (B) is to misunderstand the meaning of counterfactual assign-
ments of quantum-mechanical probabilities. Saying that p (qi|a, b) is the (objective)
probability with which qi would be obtained, given the outcomes |a〉〈a| and |b〉〈b| at
the respective times ta and tb, is in all relevant respects exactly the same as saying
that p (qi|a, b) is the (subjective) probability with which qi is obtained given the same
outcomes at times ta and tb. What else could statement (A) possibly mean?
None of the arguments marshaled by Kastner and the authors cited by her suc-
ceed in proving that statement (B) “differs significantly” from statement (A). That
the outcome at tb might be different from |b〉〈b| if the Q measurement were made,
given the outcome at ta alone, is irrelevant since the outcomes at ta and tb are both
given. The argument from cotenability fails because it conflates statements about
individual systems with statements about ensembles of systems. The attempt to
replace p (qi|a, b) (eq. 6) by pK(qi|a, b) (eq. 8) in (A) and the attempt to show that
counterfactual uses of the ABL rule yield consequences that are inconsistent with
quantum theory, both fail because they combine expressions that imply that the Q
measurement is both performed and not performed. One does not do justice to the
counterfactuality of probability assignments by arguments that begin by assuming
that Q is not measured and end up by assuming that Q is measured. One does it
justice by considering possible worlds in which Q is measured or a suitably pre- and
post-selected ensemble of actual-world systems.
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4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OBJECTIVE
PROBABILITIES
In this section I want to elucidate the significance of the existence of objective
probabilities. Such probabilities are not merely best guesses based on a complete
knowledge, and thus free from any element of ignorance; they also tell us something
important about the objective world.
To begin with, let us consider the following experiment [24]. A particle initially in
possession of the property |ψ1〉〈ψ1| is eventually found in possession of the property
|ψ2〉〈ψ2|, where |ψ1〉 = (|A〉+ |B〉+ |C〉)/
√
3 and |ψ2〉 = (|A〉+ |B〉 − |C〉)/
√
3. The
projection operators PA = |A〉〈A|, PB, and PC represent the respective properties
of being inside one of three sealed boxes A, B, and C at an intermediate time t. The
ABL probability of finding the particle inside box A at the time t is
p (A|ψ1, ψ2) = |〈ψ1|PA|ψ2〉|
2
∑
j |〈ψ1|Pj|ψ2〉|2
. (13)
As it stands, p (A|ψ1, ψ2) is underdetermined. To assign to it a value, we still have to
specify exactly which observable is being measured. If it is the observable Q whose
eigenkets are |A〉, |B〉, and |C〉, the denominator is given by
|〈ψ1|PA|ψ2〉|2 + |〈ψ1|PB|ψ2〉|2 + |〈ψ1|PC |ψ2〉|2 = 1
9
+
1
9
+
1
9
=
1
3
. (14)
Since the numerator is equal to 1/9, p (A|ψ1, ψ2) is equal to 1/3. If on the other
hand we measure the binary observable QA = PA, the denominator is given by
|〈ψ1|PA|ψ2〉|2 + |〈ψ1|(PB +PC)|ψ2〉|2 = 1
9
+ 0 =
1
9
, (15)
and p (A|ψ1, ψ2) is equal to 1. By the same token, if we measureQ then p (B|ψ1, ψ2) =
1/3, and if we measure QB then p (B|ψ1, ψ2) = 1.
I would like to discuss these results in the context of a somewhat more realistic
setup. Consider a wall W in which there are three holes A, B and C. In front of the
wall there is a particle source E. Behind the wall there is a particle detector D. Both
E and D are equidistant from the three holes. Behind C there is a device that causes
a phase shift by pi. Pj now represents the alternative “the particle goes through hole
14
j”, where j may also stand for a union like B ∪ C, the opening made up of B and
C. For particles emitted by E the prior probability measure (with respect to the
time at which they pass the wall) thus is |ψ1〉, and for particles detected by D the
posterior probability measure (with respect to the same time) is |ψ2〉. To measure
QA, we place near A a device FA that beeps whenever a particle passes through A.
To measure QB, we place near B a device FB that beeps whenever a particle passes
through B. To measure Q, we use both devices. (If the devices are 100% efficient,
the absence of a beep then tells us that the particle went through C.)
What we just found is this: If only FA is in place, the particle goes through A with
probability one (assuming, of course, that it is both emitted by E and detected by
D). If only FB is in place, the particle goes through B with probability one. If both
beepers are in place, the particle is equally likely to go through any of the three holes.
Hence ABL probabilities in general are contextual—they depend on the distinctions
that a particular setup permits us to make [25]. By measuring Q we can tell whether
the particle goes through A, through B, or through C. By measuring QA, we can tell
whether it goes through A or through B∪C. With the former setup (both beepers in
place) three properties are available for predication—“through A”, “through B”, and
“through C”,—with the latter (one beeper in place) only two are available. With the
former setup three spatial distinctions are warranted—between A and B, between A
and C, and between B and C,—with the latter only one is warranted. p (A|ψ1, ψ2)
depends on the spatial distinctions that are warranted within the complement of A in
A∪B∪C. If none are warranted by the experimental setup then p (A|ψ1, ψ2) = 1. If
the distinction between B and C is warranted by the setup then p (A|ψ1, ψ2) = 1/3.
The contextuality of objective ABL probabilities makes it obvious that proba-
bility one does not imply actual possession of a value (by an observable) or of a
property (by a physical system): From our ability to infer with probability one the
result of measuring a physical quantity at time t, it does not follow that at the
time t there exists an element of reality corresponding to the physical quantity and
having a value equal to the predicted measurement result. Hence the only reason
we have for attributing a contingent property q to a physical system or a value v
15
to a quantum-mechanical observable is the occurrence/existence of an actual event
or state of affairs from which the possession of q or v can be inferred, or by which
it is indicated. In other words, the contextuality of ABL probabilities implies that
the contingent properties of physical systems are extrinsic: They supervene on what
happens or is the case in the rest of the world. To paraphrase Wheeler [26], no
property is a possessed property unless it is an indicated property. In short, owing
to their contextuality, ABL probabilities cannot be assigned without specifying the
range of values of an observable that is measured or assumed to be measured; and
owing to their extrinsic nature, contingent properties cannot be attributed unless
their possession is warranted by facts [27].
It may be held that, unlike an ABL probability equal to one, a Born probability
equal to one is sufficient for the possession of a value [28], or that an element of
reality corresponding to an eigenvalue of an observable Q exists at a time t if the
Born probability measure for the time t has the pure form |ψ(t)〉〈ψ(t)| and |ψ(t)〉 is
an eigenstate of Q. But this is an error. The extrinsic nature of contingent properties
can be established without invoking ABL probabilities [2]. The contextuality of ABL
probabilities merely confirms it [29].
Cohen [8] states that in standard quantum mechanics, probabilities for obtaining
particular results are not contextual. What he means is that Born probabilities
are not contextual. As was shown in Sec. 2, both the Born rule and the ABL rule
follow straight from the quantum-mechanical representation of contingent properties
as projection operators on a Hilbert space. Both therefore are tools of standard
quantum mechanics. Cohen further states that the product rule is always valid
in standard quantum mechanics. According to the product rule, if X and Y are
commuting observables, if a measurement of X will yield x with Born probability one
and a measurement of Y will yield y with Born probability one, then a measurement
of XY will yield xy with Born probability one. This too is a statement about Born
probabilities, not a statement about standard quantum mechanics. ABL probabilities
do not always satisfy the product rule, and therefore standard quantum mechanics
does not always satisfy the product rule. The operators QA = PA and QB = PB
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commute; an intervening measurement of QA would yield 1 (“through A”) with
probability one; an intervening measurement of QB would yield 1 (“through B”)
with probability one; yet a measurement of QAQB would yield nothing because
(i) QAQB = 0 and (ii) there is no world in which QAQB can be measured. While
QA is measured in worlds in which only FA is in place, QB is measured in worlds
in which only FB is in place. Hence it is logically impossible for both QA and QB
to be measured in the same world. What is measured in a world in which both
beepers are in place is not QAQB but Q. Thus the product rule is “violated” only
by combinations of counterfactual statements referring to different possible worlds.
Either type of probability has its specific use. The ABL rule is obviously of no use
for predicting, on the basis of data obtained before time t, the result of a measurement
performed at the time t, for its application presupposes knowledge of the results of
measurements performed after the time t. [Even if the measurement at the time t is
the last measurement ever to be performed on the system, we would have to know
this in order to have sufficient information for applying the ABL rule (6) with the
trivial property 1 in place of |b〉〈b|.] For predictions, we must use the Born rule.
The Born rule, on the other hand, is of little use when it comes to sounding the
ontological implications of quantum mechanics, for these must be based on objective
probabilities (which are free of any element of ignorance), and such probabilities, as
was shown in Sec. 2, are ABL probabilities.
With Mermin [1] I believe that all the mysteries of quantum mechanics can be
reduced to the single puzzle posed by the existence of objective probabilities. As
I see it, the key to this puzzle is the contingent reality of spatial and temporal
distinctions [2]. We are neurophysiologically disposed to think of space as something
that exists by itself (rather than by virtue of the relational properties of matter), that
contains matter (rather than spatial relations between material objects), and that
is intrinsically and infinitely differentiated and thus adequately represented by a set
of points that can be labeled by triplets of real numbers [30]. Yet if all conceivable
spatial divisions were intrinsic to space, they would have an unconditional reality, and
one of the following statements would necessarily be true of every object S contained
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in the union R∪R′ of two spatial regions: (i) S is inside R; (ii) S is inside R′; (iii) S
has two parts, one in R and one in R′. No particle could ever pass through the union
of two slits without passing through either slit in particular and without consisting
of parts that pass through different slits. But this is precisely what particles do when
interference fringes are observed in two-slit experiments (and we do not postulate
hidden variables). Hence, spatial divisions cannot be intrinsic to space. They have
a contingent reality. Like the contingent properties of quantum-mechanical systems,
they are extrinsic; they supervene on the actual goings-on in the physical world, and
they may be real for one object and nonexistent for another.
It is a fundamental principle of quantum mechanics that the probability of a
process P capable of following several alternatives depends on whether or not the al-
ternative taken by the process is indicated or capable of being indicated. If something
indicates the alternative taken or if this is capable of being indicated, the probability
of the process is given by the sum of the probabilities associated with its alternatives.
By “capable of being indicated” I mean that the alternatives of P are correlated with
the alternatives of another process P ′ such that a determination of the alternative
taken by P ′ reveals the alternative taken by P. (Paradigm examples of this kind
of a situation are the experiments of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [31, 32] and of
Englert, Scully, and Walther [33, 34, 35].) On the other hand, if nothing either indi-
cates or is capable of indicating the alternative taken by the process, the probability
of the process is given by the absolute square of the sum of the amplitudes associated
with the alternatives. What is the meaning of this fundamental principle?
I submit that if the alternative taken is indicated, we add probabilities because
in this case the conceptual distinction that we make between the alternatives has a
reality for the process or the system undergoing it—the distinction corresponds to
something in the objective world. If the alternative taken is neither indicated nor
capable of being indicated, we add amplitudes because in this case the conceptual
distinction that we make between the alternatives has no reality for the process
or the system undergoing it—the distinction corresponds to nothing in the objective
world [36]. In our three-hole experiment it is the presence of FA that makes the spatial
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distinction between A and B ∪ C a reality for the particle. Assuming the beepers
to be 100% efficient [37], the presence of FA warrants two objective truth values,
one for the proposition “The particle goes through A” and one for the proposition
“The particle goes through B∪C”. The existence of these two truth values warrants
the reality, for the particle, of the distinction between the two spatial regions A and
B ∪ C. The reality of this distinction is the reason why in the denominator of the
right-hand side of eq. (13) we add the probabilities associated with the alternatives
represented by PA and PB∪C = PB +PC (eq. 15). By the same token, the presence
of both beepers warrants objective truth values for three propositions, “The particle
goes through A”, “The particle goes through B”, and “The particle goes through
C”. The existence of these three truth value warrants the reality, for the particle,
of the distinction between the three spatial regions A, B and C. The reality of this
distinction is the reason why in the denominator of the right-hand side of eq. (13) we
add the probabilities associated with the alternatives represented by PA, PB, and
PC (eq. 14).
It needs to be stressed that this explanation of the uncertainty principle—as
stated by Feynman and Hibbs [38]: Any determination of the alternative taken by
a process capable of following more than one alternative destroys the interference
between alternatives—owes nothing to the ABL rule. It rests on the fact that a
successful measurement of an observable Q with n eigenvalues warrants attributing
n truth values to n propositions, and thus warrants the objective distinctness of the
n alternatives. The contextuality of ABL probabilities (as well as Born probabili-
ties [29]) merely emphasizes the contingent reality of the distinctions we are wont
to make. Given two observables with a common eigenvalue q, the ABL probabil-
ity associated with q in general depends on which of the two observables is being
measured—it depends on the entire spectrum of the observable being measured. In
particular, the probability of finding that the particle goes through A depends on
whether or not our distinction between B and C is objectively warranted (that is,
whether or not the measurement is capable of distinguishing between “The particle
goes through B” and “The particle goes through C”).
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The ontological significance of objective probabilities, then, is that they signal the
unreality of some of the conceptual distinctions that we make. Since the warranted
distinctions depend on what precisely is indicated, so do the probabilities of the
corresponding alternatives.
If we conceptually partition space into smaller and smaller regions, we eventually
arrive at a partition {Ri} into finite (rather than infinitesimal) regions that are so
small that the distinctions we make between them have no reality at all [2, 30]. Our
spatial distinctions bottom out in a sea of objective probabilities. At a scale at which
position-indicators (“detectors”) with sufficiently small and sufficiently localized sen-
sitive regions no longer exist, all we can say is counterfactual and probabilistic. This
tells us that the world is only finitely differentiated spacewise. Conversely, the limited
spatial differentiation of the objective world finds its proper expression in counter-
factual assignments of objective probabilities.
What is true of the world’s spatial aspect is equally true of its temporal aspect.
There is no such thing as an intrinsically differentiated time, and therefore not only
the contingent properties of things but also the times at which they are possessed are
extrinsic. What is temporally differentiated is physical systems, and every physical
system is temporally differentiated to the extent that it passes through successive
states, in the proper sense of “state” that connotes properties indicated by facts.
And since no finite system passes through an infinite number of successive states in
a finite time span, no such system is infinitely differentiated timewise. The times that
exist for a system S are the (factually warranted) times at which it has (factually
warranted) properties [2, 30].
How, then, are we to conceive of system S during the interval between the times
ta and tb? Since during this interval S lacks factually warranted properties, all that
can be said about S between ta and tb is counterfactual and probabilistic. Our
conceptual temporal distinctions, too, bottom out in a sea of objective probabilities.
Not only is there no state (in the proper sense just defined) that obtains during this
interval, but also there is no time between ta and tb at which any state could obtain.
The importance of this result cannot be overemphasized. It entails that the pa-
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rameter t appearing in the (prior) Born probability |〈a(t)|qi〉|2, in the posterior Born
probability |〈qi|b(t)〉|2, and in the ABL probability |〈a(t)|qi〉〈qi|b(t)〉|2/∑j|〈a(t)|qj〉〈qj |b(t)〉|2
cannot be interpreted as the time at which anything obtains per se. The parameter
t refers to the time of a measurement. Only if a measurement is actually made does
it represent a time that exists for S because only then is there a contingent prop-
erty that can be attributed to S at the time t. If the measurement is not actually
made, the time at which it is made in a possible world does not exist for the actual-
world edition of S. It follows in particular that neither the prior probability measure
|a(t)〉 nor the posterior probability measure |b(t)〉 nor the ABL probability measure
〈a(t)‖b(t)〉 [39] can be interpreted as something that obtains at the time t [40]. If the
measurement is made, what obtains at time t is a result rather than a probability
measure, and if the measurement is not actually made, there is no time t at which
anything concerning S could obtain.
5 QUANTUM COUNTERFACTUALS
AND THE “FLOW” OF TIME
In this section I want to point out a common but unwarranted assumption about
the temporal aspect of the physical world, and I want to show that this assumption
leads to the views that Kastner is defending in her Comment [4]. Needless to say, I
cannot avow that she actually makes this assumption.
The conclusions we have reached in the previous section run counter to a common
way of thinking about time, according to which the experiential now and the temporal
distinctions that we base on it are features of the physical world—the world accessible
to physics. The experiential now is temporally unextended and undifferentiated. If
it did correspond to something in the physical world, this would seem to warrant the
notion of an objective instantaneous state that evolves in an infinitely differentiated
time. Yet this contradicts the fact that the world is only finitely differentiated
timewise.
In truth, nothing in the physical world corresponds to the experiential now and
the temporal distinctions that we base on it. There simply is no objective way to
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characterize the present or to distinguish between the past, the present, and the fu-
ture. These distinctions can be characterized only subjectively, by how they relate to
us: through memory, through the present-tense immediacy of qualia (introspectible
properties like pink or turquoise), or through anticipation. In the world accessible to
physics we may qualify events or states of affairs as past, present, or future relative
to other events or states of affairs, but we cannot speak of the past, the present, or
the future.
In classical physics this is not blindingly obvious. Classical physics is consistent
with the notion of an instantaneous state that evolves in an infinitely differentiated
time, and that encapsulates not only possessed properties but also everything that
(i) happened or obtained at earlier times and (ii) is causally relevant to what happens
or obtains at later times. This is how we come to conceive of “fields of force” that
evolve in time (and therefore, in a relativistic world, according to the principle of
local causality) and that causally link earlier times to later times (and therefore, in a
relativistic world, local causes to their distant effects). But this does not entail that
the notion of an evolving instantaneous state is itself consistent. If we conceive of
temporal relations in the physical world, we conceive of their relata at the same time
even though they happen or obtain at different times. Since we can’t help it, that
has to be OK. But it is definitely not OK if we introduce into our simultaneous and
spatial mental picture of a temporal whole anything that evolves or advances across
this temporal whole. One cannot represent a spatiotemporal whole as a simultaneous
spatial whole and then imagine the present as advancing through it or an instanta-
neous state as evolving in it. To do this is to depict the spatiotemporal whole U as
persisting unchanged in a time that is extraneous to U , and to depict something as
advancing or evolving across the unchanging U in that extraneous time. There is only
one time, the fourth dimension of space-time. There is not another time in which
anything evolves or advances across space-time as if space-time itself—rather than
our mental picture of it—were a persisting and unchanging whole. If the present is
anywhere in the spatiotemporal whole, it is trivially and vacuously everywhere—or,
rather, everywhen.
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To philosophers the perplexities and absurdities entailed by the notion of an
advancing present or a flowing time are well known [41]. Physicists began to recognize
the subjectivity of the present and the nonexistence of an evolving instantaneous
state with the discovery of the relativity of simultaneity. In the well-known words of
Hermann Weyl, “The objective world simply is; it does not happen. Only to the gaze
of my consciousness, crawling upward along the life line of my body, does a section
of this world come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously changes in
time.” [42] Yet the non-objectivity of the now remains deeply counterintuitive [43].
Where space is concerned, we have no difficulty in abstracting from our subjective,
perspectival point of view and adopt “the view from nowhere” [44]. Where time is
concerned, we find it incomparably more difficult to abstract from our subjective,
present-centered point of view and adopt “the view from nowhen” [45], not least
because this seems to conflict with our incorrigible self-perception as free agents,
which seems to require an open future [46].
In the world of physics, the future is as closed as the past. (This follows directly
from the non-objectivity of the distinction between the future and the past.) If sys-
tem S has property |a〉〈a| at time ta and property |b〉〈b| at time tb, then it always
has been and always will be true that system S has these properties at the respective
times ta and tb. There is nothing objectively or physically open about this. All that
is “open” in respect of this is our knowledge, prior to these times, of the properties
possessed at these times. What is (and always has been and always will be) objec-
tively or physically open is the results of unperformed measurements. That is why
we can assign to them objective probabilities.
If we retain the fallacious notion of the objectivity of the now and of the tem-
poral distinctions that are based on it, or if we subscribe to the ensuing idea of an
evolving instantaneous state, we are committed to regarding system S as infinitely
differentiated timewise and to attributing to S a state that obtains at every in-
stant of time. Quantum mechanics offers us not one but three candidates for such
a state: the “prepared” or “retarded” state |a(t)〉, the “retropared” or “advanced”
state |b(t)〉, and the time-symmetric two-state 〈a(t)‖b(t)〉. For reasons that are psy-
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chological rather than physical, quantum realists usually settle for |a(t)〉, which leads
to the well-known measurement problem. (The projection postulate is as mysterious
when applied to evolving states of affairs as it is trivial when applied to probability
measures.)
Another consequence of the myth of an evolving instantaneous state is that a
difference in what obtains at the intermediate time t must make a difference to what
obtains at later (earlier) times given that it makes no difference to what obtains at
earlier (later) times. The intervening measurement “disturbs the system”—an ubiq-
uitous but illegitimate phraseology found, for instance, in Sharp and Shanks [7],—
with the result that the “disturbed” system is necessarily different from the “undis-
turbed” system either before or after the “disturbance” (or both). This notion im-
plies an apparent infringement of cotenability: The state that obtains before the
hypothetical measurement of Q and the state that obtains after this measurement
cannot be both independent of the truth value of the antecedent of (A). As Kastner
puts it, “holding fixed both pre- and post-selection states” [4] is impossible. If the
prepared state |a〉 obtains before the Q measurement at time t then either |a〉 or one
of the eigenstates of Q obtains after the time t, depending on whether or not the
measurement is made. If the retropared state |b〉 obtains after the time t then either
|b〉 or one of the eigenstates of Q obtains before the time t, depending on whether or
not the measurement is made [47]. (If one thinks of 〈a‖b〉 as the state that obtains
between ta and tb in the absence of an intervening measurement, an intervening mea-
surement changes both the earlier and the later state: If the measurement yields qi,
the former state becomes 〈a‖qi〉 while the latter state becomes 〈qi‖b〉.)
The relevant background conditions, however, are not probability measures, nor
are these states that obtain. The relevant background conditions are the possessed
properties that determine probability measures. The unmeasured system differs from
its possible-world counterpart neither at the times ta and tb (at which times the same
properties are possessed in both worlds) nor during the intervals between ta and t
and between t and tb (during which intervals no properties are possessed in either
world) but only at the time t, which exists for the measured system but not for the
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unmeasured one. The intervening measurement has no influence whatsoever on what
obtains at any other time. It has an influence on some probability measures but none
on the relevant probability measures. The relevant probability measures are the prior
probability measure |a〉 for times earlier than t and the posterior probability measure
|b〉 for times later than t, while what is affected by the intervening measurement is
the prior probability measure |a〉 for times later than t and the posterior probability
measure |b〉 for times earlier than t. The ABL probability for the time t is obtained
by combining, according to Bayes’ theorem, the probabilities that are unaffected by
the measurement, and thus it is independent of whether or not the measurement is
actually performed.
Cohen [8] appears to reject the counterfactual use of the ABL rule not only on
the basis of the intrinsically inconsistent eq. (9) but also on the ground that that
use is “not consistent with realist interpretations of quantum mechanics.” This,
however, is no ground for rejecting counterfactual uses of the ABL rule. Rather,
it is ground for rejecting realist interpretations of quantum mechanics. By “realist
interpretations” Cohen may mean interpretations that endorse either Redhead’s suf-
ficiency condition [28], according to which Born probability one implies the existence
of an element of reality, or the so-called “eigenstate-eigenvalue link,” according to
which “being in” an eigenstate of some observable implies the same. In point of
fact, neither does imply the existence of an element of reality [2]. Or else Cohen may
mean interpretations that construe probability measures as instantaneous states that
evolve in an infinitely differentiated time. Such interpretations involve the double
error of (i) treating time-dependent probability measures as if they were actual states
and of (ii) extending temporal distinctions beyond the limits within which they are
objectively warranted. Is instrumentalism the sole alternative to such realist inter-
pretations? I submit that, on the contrary, the correct ontological interpretation
of quantum mechanics can be found only when such realist interpretations are re-
jected. The highlights of that interpretation are the contingent reality of spatial and
temporal distinctions and the existence of finite limits to the spatial and temporal
differentiation of the physical world.
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